The Shadrin Affair: A Double Agent Double-Crossed

By Tad Szulc

“... Shadrin disappeared after United States intelligence senselessly thrust him into the role of double agent with the KGB...”

It was through a stunning succession of blunders, carelessness, and inexcusable acts of intelligence greed spanning a sixteen-year period that the United States lost its most valuable Russian military defector. The missing man is believed to be either dead or incarcerated in the Soviet Union.

There are still questions which probably will never be satisfactorily answered, but all indications are that the man known as Nicholas George Shadrin was kidnapped by the Soviets through the fault of American intelligence agencies. There is little reason to believe that he redefected voluntarily, that he was killed by the CIA (as the Russians have insinuated), or that, tired of being a pawn for both sides, he decided to create a new life for himself somewhere in the world.

Shadrin disappeared in Vienna in December 1975, after United States intelligence had senselessly thrust him into the immensely dangerous role of a double agent working with the KGB, the Soviet secret service. He vanished under circumstances that make it clear that he was cruelly used by his superiors as bait for the Russians. Spies, after all, are expendable when they become a problem.

That Shadrin, a gregarious, intelligent, onetime Soviet Baltic-fleet destroyer commander, was recruited by the CIA in 1959, and had not simply fled to the West to marry the woman he loved—as alleged at the time by him and the United States government—was a closely guarded secret, until now, and it sheds wholly new light on his covert relations with the American intelligence establishment.

It explains why he agreed to serve as a double agent under extremely bizarre and controversial conditions, and it may also help to explain the strange behavior, after his disappearance, of two succeeding administrations, their unwillingness to open secret intelligence files on him to his wife and her lawyer in their search for the truth, and the glaring inconsistencies encountered during a private investigation of the Shadrin case.

Defectors are one of the most sensitive subjects in intelligence operations, after all, and neither the administration on the highest level nor senior intelligence officers are prepared to discuss various theories surrounding the Shadrin case. (This reluctance was further enhanced by the defection last month of Arkady N. Shevchenko, the Soviet diplomat who served as undersecretary general of the United Nations in New York. Shevchenko is the greatest diplomatic intelligence prize ever won by the United States.)

At first, Shadrin was worth his weight in gold to the United States. At the time when the Soviet Union launched a major buildup of its navy, the information brought by Shadrin was crucial to the United States Navy. After he outlived his usefulness, however, he was transformed into a double agent to satisfy the insatiable appetite of American intelligence. If it were not for this greed, Shadrin would be living tranquilly in the United States today, like other Soviet defectors.

His name originally was Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov, but on orders, after his arrival in the United States, he changed it to Shadrin—after the hero of Pushkin's tale The Captain's Daughter (his wife's father is a Polish merchant-marine captain). It was a pointless deception, because he testified as Artamonov in an open session of the House Committee on Un-American Activities in September 1960, and the audience included a Soviet diplomat busily taking notes. Afterward, no effort was made to conceal his real identity, and Shadrin was the nearest thing to a public figure in intelligence circles. This was the first major blunder and led to all the others.

Nobody, it seems, wishes to delve into intelligence secrets that could cause considerable embarrassment to the United States. Full disclosure could, for example, highlight the sixteen years of blunders surrounding Shadrin's activities in this country and abroad, methods employed by American intelligence, and conflicts involving the CIA, the FBI, and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Shadrin was not a run-of-the-mill spy or defector: He had high-level acquaintances and friendships in American intelligence, which made him a vulnerable figure.

One friend was Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, who, as director of naval intelligence, was his boss during the time the Russian ex-officer served as a special consultant to the navy. And Admiral Stansfield Turner, for example, got to know Shadrin sufficiently well to write him "Dear Nick" letters (Shadrin had lectured at the Naval War Col...
lege, in the early 1970s, when Turner was his president).

It is noteworthy that after Shadrin's wife, Dr. Ewa Shadrin, despaired of any effective action by the Ford administration on his behalf and retained Richard D. Copaken, a partner in the prestigious Washington law firm of Covington & Burling (once Dean Acheson's firm), the White House volunteered payment of the legal fees.

Ewa Shadrin accepted the offer. She is the Polish woman with whom Shadrin fled in 1959 and whom he married a year later in Baltimore. Now she practices dentistry in an office at their house in McLean, Virginia.

The law firm's bills were paid from February 1976 until August 1977, when the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post published the first stories about Shadrin's disappearance. Payments were never resumed yet, though the government says it has the matter under advisement.

Ewa Shadrin still does receive Shadrin's paychecks from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), where her husband was ostensibly employed while serving as a double agent. She gets $720 biweekly (after deductions), which adds up to $18,720 annually.

Interestingly, neither side denies that Shadrin was a double agent. Immediately after his disappearance, CIA and FBI case officers told Ewa Shadrin that Nick, as he is known to his American friends, had been working since 1966 for United States intelligence. They wanted to be taken to her home to see him. Purnomo may have been the CIA's emissary.

One of the most difficult intelligence problems is to establish the motivations of defectors or potential defectors. As Ewa tells the story, Shadrin, estranged from his wife in the Soviet Union, had made up his mind to defect to the West as early as March 1959 as the only way to marry Ewa. Intelligence officers who have read parts of Shadrin's secret files at the CIA—the sections pertaining to his recruitment by the agency—think that while he undoubtedly wanted to marry Ewa, the final incentive was provided by American intelligence. Thus his motives were, indeed, mixed.

According to the CIA file, Shadrin agreed to defect with a cache of documents—copies of the Soviet navy's "commander reports" that included current naval operational intelligence—and to serve as an adviser to United States intelligence on Russian naval matters. However, he was to arrange means of defection himself—the CIA couldn't help him there.

In return, Shadrin was guaranteed the new life in America, CIA payment for the completion of Ewa's dental education, his job, and citizenship.

He decided to flee by boat to Sweden on June 7, a Sunday, because there would be little traffic on the Baltic. Shadrin and Ewa departed at 7:30 P.M. It was a clear and warm evening, and the excuse was that they were going fishing. To avoid arousing suspicion he took along 25-year-old Ilya Aleksandrovich Popov, the sailor who always handled the CIA's launch. Ewa was forbidden by Shadrin to bring anything except for a handbag and a raincoat. They both wore sports clothes, although Shadrin had his uniform in the cabin. A gun was hidden below deck.

The crossing took 24 hours. There was no conversation with Popov, because in the Soviet navy a sailor is not permitted to address an officer without first being spoken to.

They landed Monday evening in a small fishing village on the Swedish island of Oland. Popov thought they were in Poland. The village was deserted, but after a while a few fishermen turned up. Shadrin and Ewa spoke neither Swedish nor English, and all they could do was to repeat the word "lice." They were then taken to the nearest police station to ask for asylum. The Swedes were unresponsive
until Shadrin produced a bottle of French cognac. Finally, a taxi appeared to take them, via ferry, to the town of Kalmar, where Shadrin identified himself to a Russian-speaking interpreter and asked for asylum. Within a day or two, he and Ewa were taken to Stockholm and housed in a jail during their interrogation. (Popov was returned to Poland.) Meanwhile, the Swedish press broke the story of the defection. It caused a minor sensation around the world, but to the CIA, Shadrin's flight was a major intelligence coup.

The next contact was with Captain Sven Rystrom, a Russian-speaking officer who had served as Swedish naval attaché in Moscow. According to Ewa, he warned them not to go to the United States, because “the Americans have the tendency to take advantage of people and then forget them.” She adds: “And this is exactly what happened.”

Two weeks later, though, when Shadrin and Ewa were released, Ewa presented herself at the American Embassy. A Russian-speaking diplomat received her in his office. Two days later, she says, “we left for West Germany.” If Shadrin hadn’t been expected, it is highly unlikely that they would have been flown out of Sweden so quickly. Normally, preliminary defector examinations last much longer.

Accompanied by a CIA escort, Shadrin and Ewa were flown from Stockholm to Frankfurt aboard a small air craft—a CIA “black flight.” They sat in a specially constructed concealed cabin. They arrived in Frankfurt on August 1 and were immediately taken to a CIA “safe house” outside the city.

After three weeks of intense interrogation, plus lie-detector and psychological tests, the Inter-Agency Defector Committee (made up of representatives of the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, and military-intelligence services) apparently accepted Shadrin’s and Ewa’s bona fides, and they were flown to Washington (on another CIA black flight) on August 21—again a relatively short time for defectors.

The debriefing process, in three Virginia safe houses, took nine months. Shadrin and Ewa were guarded around the clock by three CIA security officers. “They smoked cigars and watched television,” Ewa recalls.

Sometimes there were eight or ten intelligence specialists questioning Shadrin about the Soviet navy. There were CIA experts and specialists from the Office of Naval Intelligence in addition to Walter Onoshko, Shadrin’s CIA case officer. The CIA interpreter was Walter Sidov. Among naval specialists were Captain Thomas L. Dwyer, later coordinator of intelligence operations for the ship Pueblo, captured by North Koreans, and William Howe, a civilian with expertise in electronic warfare.

Naval Intelligence officers who debriefed Shadrin say that he was everything the navy had wanted in the way of a first-rate defector. Not only was he familiar with operational data about Soviet destroyers and anti-submarine warfare, but he also displayed a profound knowledge of the overall workings of the Soviet navy.

On September 14, the CIA made the mistake of producing Shadrin before the House Committee on Un-American Activities under his real name of Artamonov. The committee also made a point of stressing Shadrin’s importance by saying that he had been “singled out for special attention and commendation in the Soviet press.”

Shadrin’s service as STIC consultant ended, inexplicably, in June 1966. After several weeks of unemployment—and worry—Shadrin was offered a job as consultant to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). This was the period when Admiral Taylor, Shadrin’s old boss as chief of Naval Intelligence, was serving a brief stint as DIA’s deputy director before becoming deputy director of the CIA. It was perhaps not purely accidental that Shadrin was hired by the DIA: It appears to have been part of a larger plan U.S. intelligence had for him.

Unfortunately, Shadrin found the DIA job demeaning and boring. In collaboration with small-fry military defectors from Communist countries, he helped translate Soviet military literature into English. For an evaluator of naval intelligence, it was humiliating: Shadrin made no bones about this to his wife and friends, and before long he wanted to do something else.

“Something else” turned up almost immediately, when Admiral Taylor proposed that Shadrin become a double agent as bait for the KGB. There are three versions of how Shadrin got involved in espionage.

The “official” version—the one given Ewa Shadrin by the FBI after her husband vanished—was that Shadrin was approached by KGB agents in Washington in the summer of 1966, right after he joined the DIA, with an offer to spy for the Soviet Union. According to this version, Shadrin reported this approach at once to the FBI, which asked him to pretend to accept the KGB proposal and, in effect, act as a double agent.

The second American version is that the reverse occurred. FBI agents, according to this version, had learned that KGB operatives with diplomatic cover were stalking the Old Post Office Building on Pennsylvania Avenue, where Shadrin’s deflectors’ unit and the FBI field office were located. The FBI’s surmise was that the Russians were trying to identify the bureau’s agents and to approach one or more defectors. Since Shadrin was the most important person in this group, the FBI assumed that he would be the principal target.

On the strength of this suspicion, an assistant director of the FBI asked Admiral Taylor to instruct Shadrin to accept KGB overtures. should they oc-
Kozlov

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cur. Taylor did so and Shadrin is said to have agreed without any hesitation.

And it was a self-fulfilling prophecy: Ten days later, a Soviet diplomat named Oleg Kozlov (known to be a KGB agent) accosted Shadrin at a bus stop at the corner of Lee Highway and Harrison Street in North Arlington to propose cooperation with the KGB. He is said to have produced photographs of Shadrin’s first wife, along with a letter from her asking him to return to the Soviet Union. Still, according to this version, Shadrin agreed. Then he went to the FBI, which told him to establish a permanent contact.

According to the third version, which appeared in Moscow’s Literary Gazette, Shadrin approached a Soviet Embassy employee at a local supermarket and asked to be returned to Russia. The Gazette says that the KGB agreed to help if Shadrin would first perform certain services.

All things considered, the second American version is probably closest to the truth, although Shadrin may have made the initial contact with the Soviets on the FBI’s behalf.

Ewa Shadrin was presumably fed the “official” version to dispel any notion that her husband had been recruited for espionage by the Americans. It would look better if Shadrin appeared to be the victim of a KGB approach.

But even if the Americans did not set up Shadrin (though this is the most likely conclusion), it remains an act of utter folly to have engaged a valuable defector, with strong ties inside the intelligence community, in the double-agent business. The truth is that the FBI and CIA didn’t know what they wanted—other than to spot KGB agents—when they activated Shadrin.

To be sure, the FBI was gratified that the first questions the Russians asked Shadrin when they met for lunch at a Washington restaurant concerned the whereabouts of Nosenko, Golitsin, and other KGB defectors in the United States. Still, the operation was a marginal proposition.

Even more interest developed when the Russians wanted to know how the United States obtains intelligence about the Soviet navy. Now the intelligence officers saw a chance to escalate the Shadrin operation. Their notion was to feed disinformation to the Soviets on American intelligence methods. This had to be done with extreme care, because Soviet experts at the other end were certain to spot anything that looked phony and conclude that Shadrin was a double agent. As an intelligence officer put it, “We gave them soft, but not false, information.”

This relationship continued for nearly five years. Shadrin maintained his high visibility, in part because he insisted on leading a normal life, but, in retrospect, Ewa thinks it odd that Nick was the only visible Soviet defector and that he had no special protection. She was never told, of course, that he was a double agent.

The great turning point in Shadrin's double-agent career came in 1971. Late in the summer, his KGB contact asked him to make a trip abroad. No reason was given, and Finland was proposed at first as a meeting site. This, however, was judged too dangerous by the Russians themselves, and they changed their minds, suggesting Montreal instead. FBI and CIA handlers told Shadrin that if the operation were to be maintained, he had no choice but to accept the trip. Thus the irrevocable step was taken and, as one of Shadrin’s CIA friends said later, “Nick was trapped.” Had reason prevailed at that time, the operation would have been aborted and the ultimate tragedy might have been averted. But intelligence greed reigned, and the Shadrins flew off to Canada in September.

Shadrin told his wife that the trip would be their vacation, but that in Montreal he had to meet a person who had “worked for the United States for 25 years.” This was the FBI cover story. The Shadrins spent a night in Montreal, and Nick spent the evening out meeting his “friend.” The next day, they rented a car and drove to Mont Tremblant.

Was it safe for Shadrin to leave the United States on his own? The FBI evidently had some reservations because it asked the intelligence division of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to provide protective coverage.

The Montreal coverage yielded a long-lens photograph of Shadrin shaking hands with a KGB agent at the door of an out-of-town villa. More impor---

The Shadrin-Nosenko Connection

There are indications that Shadrin was caught up in some manner in the long, silent battle within the intelligence community over the bona fides of Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, the most famous KGB defector to the United States. Although they never met in the United States, Nosenko and Shadrin had been schoolmates at Frunze Naval Academy in Leningrad and Nosenko was later connected with the naval-intelligence branch of the Soviet military-intelligence service, while Shadrin went off to be a destroyer commander with access to operational intelligence. Nosenko fled the Soviet Union in 1964, five years after Shadrin; he was the agent whose testimony had confirmed the belief of the FBI's late director, J. Edgar Hoover, that Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin of President Kennedy, had no ties with the KGB. This helped to make the FBI's conclusions acceptable to the Warren Commission.

The CIA, however, developed subsequent suspicions that Nosenko was a KGB "deep plant" and he remained imprisoned by the agency until 1967, when the still-controversial decision was made, in effect, to clear him.

In charge of clearing Nosenko was Admiral Taylor, the CIA deputy director who had persuaded Shadrin to become a double agent. One of Nosenko's principal defenders was the CIA's Leonard McCoy, who was later Shadrin's case officer, and who, after the disappearance, turned out to be a source of contradictory information about the case. Bruce Solie, the CIA officer who directed Nosenko's re-examination and was his handler following imprisonment, was dispatched to Vienna in 1975 to escort Ewa Shadrin back to Washington when her husband failed to return from the KGB meeting.

What, if anything, is the meaning of these coincidences? Some intelligence officers believe that the clearing of Nosenko, whom the CIA and the FBI had finally decided to trust, suggested that American intelligence was free of Soviet "deep plant" agents. If Nosenko was not a plant, the CIA reasoning went, then it was safe to assume that Shadrin was not one, either. This may have been stretching the point, but the fact remains that Shadrin was activated as a double agent on behalf of the United States at the time the process of rehabilitating Nosenko was under way.

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tant, Shadrin was told that he would soon be working with an "illegal" and that he would be supplied in Washington with special intelligence equipment.

To the FBI and the CIA, this was sensational news. Smashing an illegal network is the dream of every intelligence service, just as the fear that one may exist is its nightmare.

If the intelligence agencies had any lingering doubt that the KGB had swallowed the Shadrin bait, it was removed early in 1972 when the promised secret equipment was delivered to the Shadrin's house. The equipment consisted of a radio receiver and transmitter (the CIA called it "communications capability"), a cipher code inside a book with hollowed pages, and a notebook with instructions on secret-writing methods.

During 1972, Shadrin received his Ph.D. in international affairs from George Washington University. Then he was instructed by his KGB contact to travel to Vienna to be trained in the use of the secret equipment and, possibly, to meet the "illegal.

Again, the intelligence agencies in Washington were overjoyed. The illegal network seemed to be within grasp, and the Shadrin operation became one of the most closely guarded intelligence secrets. There was no question of Shadrin's not going to Vienna; in fact, the CIA and the FBI claim that he was eager to do it. But there was also no thought of providing protection surveillance for him in Vienna. Intelligence officers say that this matter was not even discussed in FBI-CIA conferences on the subject.

Shadrin's Vienna meeting was scheduled for September 8, and he told his wife that it would be part of a European vacation. Their first stop was Madrid; from there they went on to Munich for the Olympic games. Shadrin told Ewa that in Vienna he would have an overnight meeting with the same man he had seen in Montreal.

Arriving in Vienna, Shadrin checked in at the plush Bristol Hotel, across the street from the Opera, and Nick went out in the early evening to keep his appointment. He took a taxi to the Votivkirche, a Vienna landmark church, and met his contact on the steps. Then a car took them to a villa out of the city. Shadrin spent about eighteen hours there with several KGB agents—one of them was Oleg Kozlov, his Washington handler—and technical experts. They trained him in the use of the type of secret equipment he had at home. He returned to the hotel at 4 P.M. the following day. The Shadrins stayed two more days in Vienna, driving around in a rented car, then flew to Athens before returning home.

Shadrin had not met the "illegal" in Vienna, which somewhat disappointed the FBI and the CIA, but they were delighted that he had undergone the technical training. In intelligence work, patience is the cardinal virtue.

Before leaving Vienna, Shadrin had been told to meet with a contact in Washington on his return, but nobody turned up. And, as it turned out, the KGB broke all contact with Shadrin for more than two years after his return from Vienna. The conventional wisdom was that the Russians were encountering difficulties in implanting an "illegal" in the United States.

It didn't occur to anybody that the KGB might have become suspicious of Shadrin and was rechecking his credentials. Again, prudence would have counseled taking Shadrin out of the operation altogether—but the greed now was too great.

Although the FBI and the CIA maintained close contact with Shadrin during this interval, he was becoming dependent. He hated his translation job at the DIA but had to keep it. He was getting edgy.

Then, in the fall of 1974, Shadrin started receiving mysterious calls at home. On one occasion, a woman speaking in English instructed him to meet somebody in the Arlington area. He was told to appear at once but decided not to do it because he was unable to contact either John Funkhouser, the CIA naval expert, or James Wooten, his FBI handler.

Early in 1975, a Russian-speaking man telephoned Shadrin at home and, trying to disguise his voice, told Shadrin that he would receive a secret-writing letter. When the letter, bearing an Oxon Hill, Maryland, postmark, arrived, Shadrin deciphered it. The writer wanted to know whether and when Shadrin could travel again, where he could attend a meeting with the "illegal," and what his cover would be. The instructions were to reply by invisible-writing letter to a dead-drop address in Berlin. Shadrin answered, proposing Spain, but another letter from Oxon Hill rejected this idea.

At a conference with FBI and CIA officials, it was decided that Shadrin should pick Vienna, "same time, same place." That Vienna was chosen by the agencies has been corroborated by highly placed intelligence sources in Washington; Leonard McCoy, the CIA case officer, insists, however, that it was the KGB that demanded the meeting be held in the Austrian capital. (This is one of the many mysteries surrounding Shadrin's disappearance. It is possible that McCoy has taken this stance to prove the entrapment theory and to remove the blame from the CIA.) A further exchange of letters set December 18 as the meeting date.

As in 1972, neither the CIA nor the FBI wanted to provide protective surveillance for Shadrin on the ground that the Russians would spot it. And this time the agencies were convinced that Shadrin would at last meet the "illegal." As intelligence officers explained later, they had no reason to think that the KGB was suspicious of Shadrin—although nobody had a valid explanation for the two-year silence.

There was a difference in the 1975 operation, however. Shortly before the Shadrins left for Vienna, the CIA arranged for them to meet a counterintelligence staff officer who was introduced as "Ann Martin" (though on one occasion she was identified as "Cynthia Martin"). She was brought to the Shadrins' home with the warning that she should be identified as a dental patient if they were interrupted.

Ann Martin was a tall, angular woman in her late forties, with a large mole on her left cheek, and glasses. She spoke Russian and German, and informed the Shadrins that they would meet again in Vienna. Then she gave Shadrin two emergency telephone numbers in Vienna, a daytime number and a night number, where she could be reached by Ewa if anything unusual happened.

The Shadrins arrived in Vienna on December 17 and took Suite 361 at the Bristol. The next evening Shadrin left the hotel to meet his contact at the Votivkirche. Ann Martin stayed with Ewa. When Shadrin returned, shortly before midnight, the CIA woman took him into the bathroom and, with the shower running, debriefed him.

He told her that he had had dinner at a small fish restaurant with the KGB's Oleg Kozlov and Mikhail Ivanovich Kuryshev. There was only small talk, and Shadrin was instructed to come to another evening meeting two days later. Shadrin was also given $1,000 in cash, although several thousand dollars had been sent to him in Washington by the KGB, and was told to rent a car the following day to become acquainted with the streets of Vienna.

At 6:30 P.M. on December 20, Shadrin left for his second meeting. Again, it did not occur to the CIA handlers that the sudden two-day delay before the presumed encounter with the "illegal" was a danger sign and that Shadrin should be withdrawn at once from the operation. An intelligence officer theorized later that Shadrin may have aroused suspicions at the dinner on December 18, and the KGB needed time for new instructions from Moscow. But the same officer said, "We never anticipated a kidnapping."
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